Federalist paper 68 summary. Federalist Paper #68 2022-10-27
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Federalist Paper No. 68, also known as "The Mode of Electing the President," is an essay written by Alexander Hamilton, one of the Founding Fathers of the United States, in support of the proposed United States Constitution. The essay was published on March 14, 1788, as part of The Federalist Papers, a series of essays written by Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay in support of the Constitution.
In Federalist Paper No. 68, Hamilton discusses the importance of the president being chosen by an "intermediate body of electors" rather than by Congress or by the people directly. He argues that this method of electing the president will ensure that the president is chosen by a group of individuals who are "most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station" and will be able to make an informed decision on who is best qualified for the office.
Hamilton also addresses concerns about foreign influence in the election of the president, stating that the "intermediate body of electors" will be able to protect against this possibility. He also argues that the proposed method of electing the president will ensure that the office is held by someone who is capable and qualified, rather than someone who is popular but lacks the necessary skills and experience to effectively lead the country.
Overall, Federalist Paper No. 68 highlights the importance of the president being elected by an "intermediate body of electors" and the benefits of this method, including protecting against foreign influence and ensuring that the president is qualified and capable. It is a key essay in the Federalist Papers and continues to be relevant today in discussions about the election of the president of the United States.
Federalist Paper #68
In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. Permanency in office frees judges from political pressures and prevents invasions on judicial power by the president and Congress. In the American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself. GradeSaver, 30 December 2011 Web. .
The Federalist Papers Essay 68 Summary and Analysis
But the convention have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the most provident and judicious attention. Yet Supreme Court cases are not tried by a jury, but instead by a panel of judges. A British monarch may end any legislative session or even dissolve parliament and a governor of New York may end legislative sessions for a limited time. In the modern-day, we have decided that the benefits outweigh the risks. The first is the more important of the two, especially in an elective office. The vice president is chosen in the same manner with the difference that the senate makes the decision if a majority is not obtained. Another valid concern the Anti-Federalists had was that the executive branch was given too much power.
Federalist 68: Why Do We Have the Electoral College?
First, since he only has one vote, he is equal to his substituents. Exercised by state courts before the Federal Convention met, and taken for granted by the majority of the members of the Convention, as well as by the ratifying conventions in the states, judicial review is expounded by Hamilton as a doctrine reaching a climax and a conclusion in this Federalist paper. It may be said that this is an extravagant case, and will never happen. As he is vested with the power of making treaties, and as there is a material distinction between the carrying and productive states, the former will be disposed to have him to themselves. France, after losing Holland, will wish to make America entirely her own. One can infer no privileges whatever while the other can make denizens of aliens, noblemen of commoners, and can erect corporations with all the rights incident to corporate bodies. That would have been a great tragedy.
In America, we have no way to remove Supreme Court justices other than impeachment, which has never happened and probably will not happen because of how the institution is viewed. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. Judicial review is another barrier against too much democracy. It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided… It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice. Perhaps the democratic branch would be well constructed, were it not for this defect. But the precautions which have been so happily concerted in the system under consideration, promise an effectual security against this mischief.
The Federalist Papers Essay 69 Summary and Analysis
He thought that the centralization and consolidation of American government under the Constitution would give those men too much power and in effect solidify an American aristocracy. Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of the United States. The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit that the election of the President is pretty well guarded. While that has not happened yet , the executive branch has far exceeded its constitutional authority. The slaveholding states located primarily in the South had insisted at the Constitutional Convention that enslaved people be counted as full persons for purposes of representation which would have given the South an outsized influence in Congress , but not for purposes of direct taxation which would reduce the federal tax burden to be borne by the slaveholding states. Summary The way of electing a president, Hamilton noted with relief, was almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure. Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of the national government, and the person who may happen to have a majority of the whole number of votes will be the President.
Federalist Papers Summary and Summaries of All 85 Essays
Hamilton assures us that through this process any man who is not qualified will not become president. Federalist Papers Summary 68 The Federalist Essays Summary No 68: Alexander Hamilton March 12, 1788 Alexander Hamilton This paper deals with the method of appointing the person to be President of the United States, a method which received very little criticism and was considered by the author to be if not perfect at least excellent. Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. In England, judges can be removed by the House of Lords. It furthermore defends the decision to elect the vice-president in much the same way that the president is elected. Much has been written concerning the sometimes dissonant nature of The Federalist Papers because they were written by multiple authors in a short amount of time. And if Congress is weak, then there is no one to stop him.
With regard to the appointment of judges and other officials, the Governor of New York has superior powers to the President. It is the interest of Spain, from the contiguity of her possessions in the western hemisphere to the United States, to be in an intimate connection with them, and influence their deliberations, if possible. Also, should the president die, the vice president will know the concerns of the Congress and president, and as such be better prepared than anyone else to take the position. There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on this head. He not only appoints but can cast an approving vote if the council of four senators is divided on the appointment. This was also one of the issues that continued to reinforce the stark division that had developed between the Federalists and Antifederalists, with the Federalists supporting the ratification of the Constitution and the Antifederalists opposing the ratification.
The executive is still worse, in this respect, than the democratic branch. To solve these problems and amend the Articles a constitutional convention was called for and began in Philadelphia on May 25, 1787. The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit that the election of the President is pretty well guarded. The Electoral College guaranteed that the president would not be chosen in a national election that treated the states as non-entities. How will you punish him if he abuse his power? We have a Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the people at large, who presides in the Senate, and is the constitutional substitute for the Governor, in casualties similar to those which would authorize the Vice-President to exercise the authorities and discharge the duties of the President. Concerns about big government, too powerful of an executive, our rights being stripped away.
If it be a public trust or office, in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. . This paper also discusses the provisions for the House of Representatives to elect the president in cases in which no candidate receives a majority of the votes. A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. This stated that enslaved people were to count as three-fifths of a person for both federal representation and for direct taxation. We know that there scarcely ever was an election of such an officer without the interposition of foreign powers. Second, the electors would be:.
