Federalist paper 72. The Federalist Papers Essay 72 Summary and Analysis 2022-11-15
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Federalist Paper 72, written by Alexander Hamilton, is one of the Federalist Papers, a series of essays written by Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay in the late 18th century to promote the ratification of the United States Constitution.
In Federalist Paper 72, Hamilton addresses the issue of the selection and duration of the office of the President of the United States. At the time the Constitution was being written, there was much debate about how the President should be chosen and how long they should serve in office.
Hamilton argues in favor of the Constitution's provisions for the President to be chosen by an electoral college and to serve a single, fixed term of four years. He believes that this system will ensure that the President is selected by a group of educated and informed individuals, rather than by the direct vote of the people. This, he argues, will prevent the President from being influenced by popular passions or prejudices, and will allow them to make decisions based on the best interests of the country.
Hamilton also defends the four-year term of office for the President. He asserts that a longer term would make the President too independent and allow them to disregard the will of the people, while a shorter term would make them too dependent on the people's favor. A four-year term, he believes, strikes the right balance between these two extremes.
In conclusion, Federalist Paper 72 presents a strong defense of the Constitution's provisions for the selection and duration of the office of the President. Hamilton's arguments in favor of an electoral college and a four-year term of office remain relevant today and continue to be cited in debates about the presidency.
Federalist Papers Summary 72
But the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. A man obsessed with wealth might indulge in corruption while able to take advantage of his station in office if he knew he would soon be excluded from these advantages. There may be conceived circumstances in which this disgust of the people, seconding the thwarted ambition of such a favorite, might occasion greater danger to liberty, than could ever reasonably be dreaded from the possibility of a perpetuation in office, by the voluntary suffrages of the community, exercising a constitutional privilege. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. And we need not be apprehensive that there will be too much stability, while there is even the option of changing; nor need we desire to prohibit the people from continuing their confidence where they think it may be safely placed, and where, by constancy on their part, they may obviate the fatal inconveniences of fluctuating councils and a variable policy. This was also one of the issues that continued to reinforce the stark division that had developed between the Federalists and Antifederalists, with the Federalists supporting the ratification of the Constitution and the Antifederalists opposing the ratification.
The Roman history records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the dissensions between the Consuls, and between the military Tribunes, who were at times substituted for the Consuls. This, nevertheless, is the precise import of all those regulations which exclude men from serving their country, by the choice of their fellow citizens, after they have by a course of service fitted themselves for doing it with a greater degree of utility. No person would think of proposing an Executive much more numerous than that body; from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of the council. Nothing appears more plausible at first sight, nor more ill-founded upon close inspection, than a scheme which in relation to the present point has had some respectable advocates, I mean that of continuing the chief magistrate in office for a certain time, and then excluding him from it, either for a limited period or forever after. With a positive duration of considerable extent, I connect the circumstance of re-eligibility.
It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. May he have no connections, no friends, for whom he may sacrifice it? And what is still worse, they might split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the magistracy. When a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end. But even in that case, may he have no object beyond his present station, to which he may sacrifice his independence? In It has been frequently remarked, that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend, for their political constitutions, on accident and force. A fourth ill effect of the exclusion would be the banishing men from stations in which, in certain emergencies of the state, their presence might be of the greatest moment to the public interest or safety. Even the love of fame, the ruling passion of the noblest minds, which would prompt a man to plan and undertake extensive and arduous enterprises for the public benefit, requiring considerable time to mature and perfect them, if he could flatter himself with the prospect of being allowed to finish what he had begun, would, on the contrary, deter him from the undertaking, when he foresaw that he must quit the scene before he could accomplish the work, and must commit that, together with his own reputation, to hands which might be unequal or unfriendly to the task. The difference between Hamilton's list and Madison's formed the basis for a dispute over the authorship of a dozen of the essays.
Federalist No.68 vs. Antifederalist No. 72: The Debate over How to Elect the President
This exclusion, whether temporary or perpetual, would have nearly the same effects, and these effects would be for the most part rather pernicious than salutary. But even in that case, may he have no object beyond his present station, to which he may sacrifice his independence? There is an excess of refinement in the idea of disabling the people to continue in office men who had entitled themselves, in their opinion, to approbation and confidence; the advantages of which are at best speculative and equivocal, and are overbalanced by disadvantages far more certain and decisive. The contrary is the usual course of things. After Alexander Hamilton died in 1804, a list emerged, claiming that he alone had written two-thirds of The Federalist essays. To reverse and undo what has been done by a predecessor, is very often considered by a successor as the best proof he can give of his own capacity and desert; and in addition to this propensity, where the alteration has been the result of public choice, the person substituted is warranted in supposing that the dismission of his predecessor has proceeded from a dislike to his measures; and that the less he resembles him, the more he will recommend himself to the favor of his constituents. That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable.
The contrary is the usual course of things. Constitution, as the essays outline a lucid and compelling version of the philosophy and motivation of the proposed system of government. A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. This position will not be disputed so long as it is admitted that the desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human conduct; or that the best security for the fidelity of mankind is to make their interests coincide with their duty. The Anti-Federalist view of representation emphasizes that the public good must be truly public without making clear how the public good differs from majority will; the Federalists emphasize the public good must be truly good, the product of sound deliberation.
Why Hamilton Thought The President Should Have Unlimited Terms
The contrary is the usual course of things. An avaricious man, who might happen to fill the office, looking forward to a time when he must at all events yield up the emoluments he enjoyed, would feel a propensity, not easy to be resisted by such a man, to make the best use of the opportunity he enjoyed while it lasted, and might not scruple to have recourse to the most corrupt expedients to make the harvest as abundant as it was transitory; though the same man, probably, with a different prospect before him, might content himself with the regular perquisites of his situation, and might even be unwilling to risk the consequences of an abuse of his opportunities. The Federalists argue that there is a public good for all the states combined and thus the federal government must have supreme power over matters relating to commerce—and commerce is spoken of as intrinsically connected to morality and virtue—for the sake of this national public good. We look forward to exploring this important debate with you! Hamilton argues that restricting the president to a single term or require him to spend time out of office before serving another term would have several ill effects. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce them into the constitution of the Executive.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1960. In 1863, Henry Dawson published Modern scholars generally use the text prepared by Jacob E. As to the second supposed advantage, there is still greater reason to entertain doubts concerning it. The Federalist Papers Date Title 1787 Oct 27 General Introduction 1787 Oct 31 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence 1787 Nov 3 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence continued 1787 Nov 7 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence continued 1787 Nov 10 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence continued 1787 Nov 14 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States 1787 Nov 15 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States continued and Particular Causes Enumerated 1787 Nov 20 Consequences of Hostilities Between the States 1787 Nov 21 The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection 1787 Nov 22 The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection continued 1787 Nov 24 The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy 1787 Nov 27 The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue 1787 Nov 28 Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government 1787 Nov 30 Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered 1787 Dec 1 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union 1787 Dec 4 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union continued 1787 Dec 5 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union continued 1787 Dec 7 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union continued 1787 Dec 8 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union continued 1787 Dec 11 Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union continued 1787 Dec 12 Other Defects of the Present Confederation 1787 Dec 14 Other Defects of the Present Confederation continued 1787 Dec 18 Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union 1787 Dec 19 Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered 1787 Dec 21 Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered continued 1787 Dec 22 Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered 1787 Dec 25 Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered continued 1787 Dec 26 Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered continued 1788 Jan 9 Concerning the Militia 1787 Dec 28 Concerning the General Power of Taxation 1788 Jan 1 Concerning the General Power of Taxation continued 1788 Jan 2 Concerning the General Power of Taxation continued 1788 Jan 2 Concerning the General Power of Taxation continued 1788 Jan 5 Concerning the General Power of Taxation continued 1788 Jan 5 Concerning the General Power of Taxation continued 1788 Jan 8 Concerning the General Power of Taxation continued 1788 Jan 11 Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government 1788 Jan 12 The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed 1788 Jan 16 Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles 1788 Jan 18 On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained 1788 Jan 19 General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution 1788 Jan 22 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered 1788 Jan 23 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered continued 1788 Jan 25 Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States 1788 Jan 26 Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered 1788 Jan 29 The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared 1788 Jan 30 The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts 1788 Feb 1 These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other 1788 Feb 2 Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention 1788 Feb 5 Periodical Appeals to the People Considered 1788 Feb 6 The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments 1788 Feb 8 The House of Representatives 1788 Feb 9 The House of Representatives continued 1788 Feb 12 Apportionment of Members of the House of Representatives Among the States 1788 Feb 13 The Total Number of the House of Representatives 1788 Feb 16 The Total Number of the House of Representatives continued 1788 Feb 19 The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation 1788 Feb 20 Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered 1788 Feb 22 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members 1788 Feb 23 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members continued 1788 Feb 26 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members continued 1788 Feb 27 The Senate 1788 Mar 1 The Senate continued 1788 Mar 5 The Powers of the Senate 1788 Mar 7 The Powers of the Senate continued 1788 Mar 8 Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered 1788 Mar 11 The Executive Department 1788 Mar 12 The Mode of Electing the President 1788 Mar 14 The Real Character of the Executive 1788 Mar 15 The Executive Department Further Considered 1788 Mar 18 The Duration in Office of the Executive 1788 Mar 19 The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered 1788 Mar 21 The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power 1788 Mar 25 The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive 1788 Mar 26 The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive 1788 Apr 1 The Appointing Power of the Executive 1788 Apr 2 The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered 1788 Jun 14 The Judiciary Department 1788 Jun 18 The Judiciary Continued 1788 Jun 21 The Powers of the Judiciary 1788 Jun 25 The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority 1788 Jul 2 The Judiciary Continued 1788 Jul 5 The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury 1788 Jul 16 Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered 1788 Aug 13 Concluding Remarks. We have seen that the Achaeans, on an experiment of two Praetors, were induced to abolish one.
(PDF) Federalist No. 72: What Happened to the Public Service Ideal?
The idea of being more independent means that a magistrate not having to please those necessary for re-election can exercise his own plan rather than a compromised plan. But even in that case, may he have no object beyond his present station, to which he may sacrifice his independence? There is no nation which has not, at one period or another, experienced an absolute necessity of the services of particular men in particular situations; perhaps it would not be too strong to say, to the preservation of its political existence. He is the absolute master of his own conduct in the exercise of his office, and may observe or disregard the counsel given to him at his sole discretion. By the same reasoning executive councils are a bad idea for the new American government. What more desirable or more essential than this quality in the governors of nations? These are some of the disadvantages which would flow from the principle of exclusion.
There is an excess of refinement in the idea of disabling the people to continue in office men who had entitled themselves, in their opinion, to approbation and confidence; the advantages of which are at best speculative and equivocal, and are overbalanced by disadvantages far more certain and decisive. If the exclusion were to be perpetual, a man of irregular ambition, of whom alone there could be reason in any case to entertain apprehension, would, with infinite reluctance, yield to the necessity of taking his leave forever of a post in which his passion for power and pre-eminence had acquired the force of habit. May he have no connections, no friends, for whom he may sacrifice it? Knowing their presidency is coming to an end might give them a tendency to act in their own interest instead of that of the general public. The Federalist begins and ends with this issue. Read Our goal at TeaParty911. A third ill effect of the exclusion would be, the depriving the community of the advantage of the experience gained by the chief magistrate in the exercise of his office. Men will feel less zeal in the discharge of their duty when they are aware of the time when the advantages of their station will end.
